Natural Rights, Positive Rights, and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms by Campbell, Jud
BOOK PROOF - CAMPBELL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/2020 3:25 PM 
 
NATURAL RIGHTS, POSITIVE RIGHTS, 
AND THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR 
ARMS 
JUD CAMPBELL* 
INTRODUCTION 
Speaking to Congress in 1789, James Madison defended his proposed bill of 
rights as a list of “simple acknowledged principles,” and not ones of “a doubtful 
nature.”1 And true to form, his inclusion of a right to keep and bear arms received 
little debate at the time.2 By the mid-nineteenth century, however, judicial inter-
pretations of that right were in disarray. Some judges interpreted the right based 
on its ostensible purpose of preserving the independence and effectiveness of mi-
litias. Others ruled that governmental power extended only to imposing modest 
restraints on personal firearms—not outright bans. Still more held that all weap-
ons regulations were unconstitutional. So why had Madison’s “simple” declara-
tion of the right to keep and bear arms become so hard to interpret? 
One possibility is a lack of any genuine original consensus.3 Another is that 
Americans were changing their views. Saul Cornell, for instance, argues that by 
the mid-nineteenth century an individualistic conception of the right to keep and 
bear arms had begun to supplant the former linkage between that right and civic 
obligations, like militia service.4 Meanwhile, Robert Leider treats Antebellum 
decisions as largely just tracking public opinion, with judges essentially making 
up doctrine as they went along.5 This Article embraces elements of each of these 
stories. But it argues that right-to-bear-arms cases also reflected the complicated 
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 1.  Statement of James Madison (Aug. 15, 1789), in 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1270, 1270 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992). 
 2.  Most of the debate in the First Congress turned on whether to exempt conscientious objectors 
from militia service. See Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The 
Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1083, 1102–09 (2008). 
 3.  See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END THE 
BATTLE OVER GUNS, at xv (2007) (“[T]here’s no definitive answer to what the Second Amendment 
means.”). 
 4.  See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 139 (2008) (stating that, during the Jacksonian era, the “new 
culture of individualism had a profound impact on legal thinking about the right to bear arms, the militia, 
and the idea of self-defense”). 
 5.  See Robert Leider, Our Non-Originalist Right to Bear Arms, 89 IND. L.J. 1587, 1587–88 (2014). 
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and often contested relationship between natural rights and positive rights that 
shaped American rights jurisprudence more broadly.6 
In part, this Article aims to show how an understanding of American rights 
discourse can illuminate the first judicial decisions interpreting the right to keep 
and bear arms.7 Though seemingly in disarray, these opinions exhibited exactly 
the sorts of disagreements that one would expect given prevailing understandings 
of natural rights and positive rights. This does not disprove that other factors 
were at play. But it suggests a potentially broader consensus about certain aspects 
of the right than scholars have appreciated.8 
More broadly, this Article argues that the first right-to-bear-arms decisions 
exemplify a tension that emerged when judges confronted claims about natural 
rights and positive rights in a changing social and legal landscape. These tensions 
arose partly from the problems of “vagueness” and “open texture” that con-
stantly appear in interpretive disputes, especially when the context shifts.9 But as 
we will see, matters were even trickier in the nineteenth century because of 
changing conceptions of the judicial role. 
This story begins in Part I with a survey of Founding-Era rights discourse, and 
particularly the complex relationship between natural and positive rights. Natu-
ral-rights reasoning was open-ended and flexible, permitting the government to 
regulate natural rights in promotion of the public good. Natural rights therefore 
sounded more in the register of political philosophy than law, with legislatures 
and juries—not judges—giving them practical effect. Positive-rights discourse, on 
the other hand, was more formalist and conservative, using a backward-looking 
 
 6.  I use the term “natural rights” advisedly, recognizing that Americans sometimes described nat-
ural rights as being surrendered upon entering into a political society. Historical disagreements over how 
to talk about natural rights, though, should not distract from a broadly shared consensus about the im-
plicit limits on governmental authority imposed by social-contract theory. See Jud Campbell, Republi-
canism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 85, 95–96 (2017). 
 7.  My methodology is to present a historical framework for understanding rights and then show 
how that framework is consistent with the earliest right-to-bear-arms decisions. My argument thus pre-
sumes, without attempting to prove here, that judges were operating within this larger conceptual frame-
work. 
 8.  I do not dispute that “Antebellum case law on the right to bear arms was deeply divided on the 
scope of the right.” Saul Cornell, Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home: Separating Historical 
Myths from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1714–15 (2012). But I do think that judges 
shared some basic premises about rights and that we can better understand these cases, including their 
conflicts, by recovering those premises. 
 9.  See generally Frederick Schauer, Second-Order Vagueness in the Law, in VAGUENESS AND 
LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 177 (Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher eds., 2016). Vague-
ness refers to a lack of clarity in how to apply a particular term. For example, the term “tall” is somewhat 
vague because people may disagree about whether a man who is just under six feet in height is “tall.” By 
contrast, “open texture” refers to “the ineliminable possibility of vagueness.” Id. at 183. For instance, 
although it may be beyond debate today that a man who is just under seven feet in height is “tall,” that 
would not be true if all other men suddenly grew an extra foot in height. In other words, even terms and 
applications of terms that seem clear today might become unclear in light of changed circumstances. 
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historical method for identifying limits on governmental power.10 Positive rights 
were therefore more amenable to judicial enforcement. But judges intervened 
only after the polity itself—through a political settlement—had already rejected 
a particular type of regulation. Judicial review thus served as only a partial check 
against abuses of legislative power.11 
Decades later, however, American judges increasingly viewed themselves as 
the anointed guardians of the constitutional order. This shift created a dilemma 
for judges—particularly when legislatures began to innovate in response to novel 
problems. The tension was stark. Emergent norms of judicial review counseled 
against absolute deference to legislative judgments. But natural rights lacked le-
gal specificity, and customary law rarely supplied clarity about how to address 
new problems. 
As will be discussed in Part II, the first cases involving the right to keep and 
bear arms perfectly illustrate this tension. In response to rampant violence, state 
legislatures in the nineteenth century began to restrict the concealed carry of 
weapons. In some respects, these laws were unprecedented—particularly by sud-
denly converting widely practiced and otherwise innocent behavior into a crime. 
If legislatures could do that, one wondered, was there anything they could not 
do? Yet while history did not directly support the validity of concealed-carry 
bans, it did not directly undermine them, either.12 Customary positive law did not 
settle the issue because the question had not previously emerged in these terms. 
Absent a clear textual or historical basis for invalidation, one judicial option 
was simply to uphold these laws. And some judges did that. Yet this approach 
had the significant downside of allowing legislatures to run roughshod over nat-
ural rights, and over the protection of customary rights that arguably applied. 
Another response was to disregard legislative acts that limited freedom in novel 
ways, or to draw some other line demarcating legislative power. And some judges 
did that. But doing so conflicted with the judicial task of merely locating, not in-
venting, constitutional limits on legislative power. 
This Article concludes with a brief discussion of how this history might bear 
on contemporary debates about the Second Amendment. Any use of early deci-
sions requires staying attuned to premises about rights and about judicial review 
 
 10.  My statement that the “discourse” was conservative is deliberate. The actual interpretive prac-
tice was often quite dynamic. For an exploration of this conflict between conservative rhetoric and dy-
namic practice in rights jurisprudence, see Jud Campbell, The Invention of First Amendment Federalism, 
97 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2019). 
 11.  See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
 12.  See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, CONCEALED WEAPON LAWS OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC: DUELING, 
SOUTHERN VIOLENCE, AND MORAL REFORM 2–3 (1999) (discussing the history of concealed-carry 
laws). This is not to say, however, that regulations of weaponry were novel. See JOSEPH BLOCHER & 
DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE 
FUTURE OF HELLER 17–18 (2018) (pointing out a host of other types of arms regulations). 
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that may differ substantially from our own.13 But while unpacking earlier rights 
decisions can lead to a better understanding of the past, it also reveals the ex-
traordinary challenge of using history to answer modern questions. Just decades 
into the nineteenth century, the first right-to-bear-arms decisions were already 
revealing latent tensions in the law. The Founders simply had not anticipated that 
changing circumstances and broader conceptions of judicial review would trans-
form rights jurisprudence.  
I 
NATURAL AND POSITIVE RIGHTS 
For its first hundred years, American constitutionalism was grounded on a 
theory of political authority known as social-contract theory.14 Rather than rest-
ing political authority on military force or divine will, social-contract theory pos-
ited that governmental authority depended on the consent of the people.15 In es-
sence, the theory sought to justify—and to limit—governmental authority by 
considering why people would agree to form a political society in the first place.16 
And the starting point in this thought experiment was the concept of natural 
rights. 
A. Natural Rights 
Americans understood natural rights as human capacities in an imagined state 
of nature without a government. These “rights” thus included any human ability 
that did not depend on governmental authority—thinking, reading, talking, eat-
ing, and so on, as well as the enjoyment of the fruits of one’s labor.17 Thomas 
Paine succinctly described these rights as “animal right[s].”18 By contrast, positive 
rights were those defined in terms of governmental authority, like rights of ha-
beas corpus, jury trials, and voting.19 
 
 13.  For a broader discussion of judicial failures to appreciate the undergirding assumptions behind 
earlier decisions, see Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 643, 645 (2015). 
 14.  See Campbell, supra note 6, at 87. The term “social compact” was more common—and perhaps 
more reflective of the authoritative and enduring nature of the agreement—but I prefer “social contract” 
to avoid confusion with the separate historical debate over the nature of the federal union, in which one 
side advocated a “compact theory” that essentially viewed the federal constitution as a treaty. 
 15.  See id. at 88. 
 16.  See id. (stating that “[s]ocial-contract theory . . . hypothesized that individuals, recognizing the 
benefits of collective action” each agreed to create a society to promote the common good, which “had 
powerful implications for the proper scope of governmental power” (citations omitted)). 
 17.  Id. at 91. 
 18.  See Thomas Paine, Candid and Critical Remarks on Letter 1, Signed Ludlow, PA. J. & WEEKLY 
ADVERTISER, June 4, 1777, at 1. 
 19.  “The Founders sometimes referred to positive rights as adventitious or social rights.” Jud Camp-
bell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 252 n.14 (2017). As used in this Article, 
positive rights contrasted with natural rights, not with negative rights. 
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Importantly, the state of nature was hypothetical, not historical.20 It was “ab-
stract” and did not dispute that “men come into the world and into society at the 
same instant.”21 Accordingly, natural rights were not limited to the freedom that 
existed at a particular historical moment. Instead, natural rights included the pos-
session and use of technologies—like firearms and printing presses—regardless 
of whether those technologies were developed after the creation of the political 
society. 
Social-contract theory next posited that humans in a state of nature would 
unanimously agree to create a political society in a social contract, with each 
member being an equal citizen of the polity.22 This body politic, commonly known 
as “the people,” would then, by majority consent, agree to a constitution that 
vested political authority in a government. In other words, social-contract theory 
described a two-stage process for establishing political authority: a social contract 
to create a polity, followed by a constitution to create a government. 
Although governmental powers were created in the constitution, individual 
rights could be recognized at either stage. Many Founders thus thought it unnec-
essary to include rights in a constitution.23 Rather, legislative or constitutional 
restatements of rights were often viewed as merely declaratory, without creating 
the rights they recognized.24 Indeed, the Ninth Amendment evinces this non-pos-
itivist conception of rights.25 Back then, the primary purpose of enumerating 
rights was to remind the government and the people about their existence and 
importance. Enumerating a natural right was irrelevant to its legal status.26 
Recognizing a natural right, however, did not deny governmental power to 
restrict that right.27 Rather, the retention of natural rights shaped the constitu-
tional scheme in more structural terms. First, only the people themselves could 
limit their own natural rights through laws passed by a representative legislature 
and enforced by a representative jury.28 Second, social-contractarian thinking 
 
 20.  Campbell, supra note 6, at 87 (citations omitted). 
 21.  JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 28 (Boston, 
Edes & Gill 1764). 
 22.  Campbell, supra note 6, at 88 (citations omitted). 
 23.  See, e.g., Statement of Roger Sherman (Aug. 13, 1789), in 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 1, at 1230 (“[T]he people are secure in [their rights], whether we 
declare them or not.”). 
 24.  See Campbell, supra note 19, at 299 n.237 (collecting sources). 
 25.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 
U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 197 (“Our written Constitution presupposes an established set of fundamental rights 
not created by the Constitution but protected or preserved by it.”). 
 26.  See Jud Campbell, Judicial Review and the Enumeration of Rights, GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 
572–76 (2017) (explaining that “judges never directly enforced state constitutional provisions that af-
firmed the inviolability of the natural rights of life, liberty, and property”). 
 27.  Indeed, as discussed below, social-contract theory posited that one of the primary purposes of 
government was to defend against the private infringement of natural rights. 
 28.  Of course, while everyone agreed that legislatures and juries had to represent the people, there 
were ongoing debates about how representative these institutions should be, both in terms of demogra-
phy and in terms of whether they should exercise independent, deliberative judgment that might depart 
from the wishes of the people at large. 
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about natural rights posited that the people could restrict natural rights only in 
promotion of the common good, rather than for the private benefit of certain 
individuals.29 
It is no surprise, then, that the Founders viewed discretionary royal licensing 
as a quintessential violation of natural rights. If the King or his agents could de-
cide who could operate a printing press and who could possess certain firearms, 
that would plainly violate natural-rights principles. First, it would privilege the 
interests of some individuals over others, without equally considering everyone’s 
interests. Second, it would consolidate power in the hands of royal officials rather 
than representative legislatures and juries.30 
These principles, however, did not point toward a libertarian conception of 
rights. Legislatures, after all, still had power to regulate these rights. The English 
Bill of Rights explicitly recognized this power with respect to the right to keep 
and bear arms, declaring that “the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms 
for their Defence suitable to their Conditions and as allowed by Law.”31 Or, as 
Massachusetts jurist George Thatcher stated, the “use of arms . . . being a natural 
right, and not surrendered by the constitution,” was one that “the people still 
enjoy, and must continue to do so till the legislature shall think fit to interdict.”32 
The natural right to possess and carry weapons required the legislature to act 
impartially, but it did not correspond to determinate, legalistic restrictions on leg-
islative power. Rather, the constitutional lodestar was the public good. 
With this understanding of social-contractarian limits, one can easily see how 
the scope of general legislative power varied according to circumstances and was 
not defined by a particular set of policy tools. Rather, the authority that came to 
be known as the “police powers” was simply governmental power to promote the 
common good.33 At one time and place, this principle might warrant a ban on 
carrying concealed weapons in public. At another time and place it might not. 
But social-contract theory trained Americans to think about these questions of 
natural rights and legislative powers in flexible and dynamic terms.34 
To be sure, lawmakers lacked rightful authority to do whatever they wanted. 
Social-contractarian principles dictated that “all civil authority delegated by the 
people”—including legislative power—“must be at all times subservient to the 
public good.”35 And judges sometimes determined that legislation was invalid on 
 
 29.  Campbell, supra note 19, at 272–73. 
 30.  Notably, this logic did not make all licensing regimes unlawful. For a later discussion, see Com-
monwealth v. Blackington, 41 Mass. 352, 358–59 (1837). 
 31.  Bill of Rights 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.) 
 32.  CORNELL, supra note 4, at 26–27 (quoting George Thatcher, Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND 
GAZETTE (Jan. 26, 1787)). 
 33.  WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 20 (1996). 
 34.  For an example of the flexible and dynamic nature of natural rights, see Brick Presbyterian 
Church v. City of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. 1826), which describes how changing habitation patterns 
over time functionally changed the government’s power to regulate burials in certain areas. 
 35.  Bank of Toledo v. City of Toledo, 1 Ohio St. 622, 631 (1853). 
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precisely this basis.36 In general, however, natural rights did not impose precise 
limits on legislative power. 
In my view, then, it makes little sense to delimit specific categories of firearms 
regulations as being within or beyond the police powers.37 Tracking weapons reg-
ulations in one period—shaped by the prevailing circumstances and attitudes of 
that period—would tell us little about the scope of the police powers in different 
circumstances. Nor did social-contract theory impose any categorical bar on 
“prohibiting” as opposed to merely “regulating” various forms of natural lib-
erty.38 The Founders recognized governmental authority to ban theater perfor-
mances, billiards halls, lotteries, profanity, various consensual sexual activities, 
and so on, based on the authority to promote the general welfare.39 
Finally, it is worth considering the much-confused issue of self-defense. A 
central feature of social-contractarian thought was that upon leaving the state of 
nature, individuals could no longer employ self-help remedies to defend their pri-
vate rights.40 In general, then, the natural right of self-defense was effectively 
transformed into a positive right known as the protection of the law. Preventing 
and remedying private violations of rights was now the responsibility of the body 
politic, not each individual. A well-recognized exception arose in cases of immi-
nent danger when resort to legal remedies was impossible.41 
Individuals thus ceded authority to a body politic to defend their rights, but 
practical considerations required the body politic to delegate some of these re-
sponsibilities to a government. The people themselves would remain in control 
of legislating, but they would do so indirectly by electing representatives. And an 
 
 36.  See, e.g., Austin v. Murray, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 121, 125 (1834) (recognizing the invalidity of a 
burial regulation but noting that a similar restriction would be valid if “made in good faith for the purpose 
of preserving the health of the inhabitants”). 
 37.  But see Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in 
Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 161–65 (2007) 
(using historical firearms regulations to draw general inferences about governmental power to regulate 
firearms). To be sure, some historians might care whether the Founders, in their own time and place, 
viewed certain types of policies as conducive or not conducive to the public good. 
 38.  But see Randy E. Barnett, Who’s Afraid of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 19 
(2006) (“If the conduct is not, in itself, necessarily rights-violating, then it may not be prohibited, but it 
may still be regulated.”). 
 39.  I take less issue with scholars who insist that the Founders understood the common good in 
terms of better securing the equal rights of all. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural 
Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1587–88 (2003); Joseph Postell, Regulation during the Amer-
ican Founding: Achieving Liberalism and Republicanism, 5 AM. POL. THOUGHT 80, 96–97 (2016). My 
views on their arguments are beyond the scope of this Article. But the crucial point to recognize—as 
illustrated by the bans mentioned above—is that governmental power existed even when particular rights 
holders were made worse off and even when those rights holders were not directly impinging upon the 
rights of others. 
 40.  JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. XXVIII, § 10, at 
194 (3d ed. 1695) (“[M]en uniting into politic societies have resigned up to the public the disposing of all 
their force, so that they cannot employ it against any fellow-citizens, any farther than the law of the 
country directs . . . .”). 
 41.  See Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights and the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237, 
245 (2000) (stating that people give up “the right to use force . . . only” when they can “appeal to the law 
for protection”). 
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executive branch and court system were established to enforce the law and settle 
private disputes. In all of these roles, however, members of the government 
would merely act as agents of the body politic.42 
But here is where Founding-Era views become especially foreign to modern 
observers. Although the Founders favored creating an executive and judicial 
branch, they also thought that the body politic should retain substantial direct 
control over the protection of law, without fully delegating this responsibility to 
the government. In the judicial branch, for instance, juries were prized primarily 
because they allowed for direct control by the people themselves.43 Citizens also 
played a key role in executive functions through institutions like the posse comi-
tatus and militia.44 And to exercise these responsibilities citizens needed training 
and weaponry. 
It was in this sense that the Founders often exalted the right of citizens to 
maintain weapons in “defense of themselves.”45 This right was part and parcel of 
the protection of law provided directly by the body politic rather than by govern-
mental agents. It was not limited to a military context, such as defense against 
foreign invasions or domestic insurrections. Indeed, some even described per-
sonal self-defense as falling within the scope of this civic duty.46 Nor was the right 
to maintain weapons in self-defense a “collective” right held by state govern-
ments. Far from it.47 But none of this suggested that the public responsibility of 
protecting private rights was somehow beyond the power and control of the body 
politic. Social-contract theory posited exactly the opposite. 
The natural right of self-defense was thus an integral part of Founding-Era 
discourse about the right to keep and bear arms, but not in the way that we might 
 
 42.  Campbell, supra note 6, at 90. 
 43.  See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 295 (1996) (describing the representative function of juries); JOHN PHILLIP REID, 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 50–52 
(1986) (explaining how people believed that “jurors represent . . . the public” (citations omitted)). 
 44.  See FEDERAL FARMER NO. 18 (1788), reprinted in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1070, 1072 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004) (“A militia, when 
properly formed, are in fact the people themselves, and render regular troops in a great measure unnec-
essary.”); Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in 
Mid-Nineteenth-Century America, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (describing the role of the posse 
comitatus and its connection to citizenship). 
 45.  Nathan Kozuskanich, Defending Themselves: The Original Understanding of the Right to Bear 
Arms, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1041, 1042 (2007) (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 385 
(D.C. Cir. 2007)); see id. at 1045 (arguing that the right to bear arms was tied to militia service and thus 
primarily intended for the defense of society as a whole). But see STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE 
FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 137 (2008) (“Recognition 
of the people’s right to bear arms ‘for the defence of themselves’ meant that individuals were entitled to 
carry arms for personal protection.”). 
 46.  James Wilson, for instance, treated the use of force “for the defence of one’s person and house” 
as a duty connected to citizenship. See James Wilson, Of Crimes Against the Right of Individuals to Per-
sonal Safety, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1142 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 
2007). 
 47.  Recall that Americans championed civic participation in militias and juries because they did not 
view militias and juries as instrumentalities of the government. 
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now expect. Unlike most other natural rights, the right of self-defense was sur-
rendered almost entirely to the body politic.48 Crucially, however, Americans did 
not think that the body politic then fully assigned that responsibility to the gov-
ernment. Rather, the right and duty of self-defense was largely retained by the 
people themselves—but principally as a body politic, not as disaggregated indi-
viduals.49 
B. Positive Rights 
But Americans did not have a unimodal understanding of rights. In addition 
to natural rights, the Founders also recognized certain fundamental positive 
rights that prohibited the government from acting in particular ways. Positive 
rights were thus defined in reference to governmental action or inaction.50 The 
right to a jury trial and the right against prior restraints, for instance, were funda-
mental positive rights because they operated as determinate rules about what the 
government had to do or could not do, regardless of legislative assessments to the 
contrary. And because these positive rights were generally legalistic, they were 
more judicially enforceable than natural rights.51 
Positive rights also contrasted with natural rights in terms of how they were 
recognized. As mentioned above, natural rights were liberties in a hypothesized 
state of nature, and therefore understanding the concept was enough to perceive 
the breadth of natural rights. By contrast, positive rights had to be created by 
each political society. One way of doing so was through constitutional enumera-
tion.52 But many Founders thought that some fundamental positive rights were 
created in the imagined social contract and could be identified through custom, 
without any need for constitutional enumeration.53 
Because of these different points of origin, the method for defining the scope 
of positive rights naturally depended on whether a written constitution had cre-
 
 48.  Rights like expressive freedom and religious freedom were retained by individuals, even though 
they could generally be collectively controlled through laws passed in promotion of the public good. By 
contrast, the natural right to defense of one’s person and property was largely surrendered to the body 
politic. 
 49.  Along similar lines, the right of revolution was held by the people as a body politic, not as indi-
viduals. Of course, as noted above, Anglo-American law long recognized the necessity of personal self-
defense, too. But modern scholarship too often focuses solely on that right without appreciating the 
broader significance of the role of the people, as a body politic, directly providing for their own defense. 
 50.  See An Old Whig IV, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Oct. 27, 1787, reprinted in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 497, 502 (John P. Kaminski 
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (describing fundamental positive rights as “particular engagements of 
protection, on the part of government,” in contrast to “natural liberty . . . retain[ed]”). 
 51.  See Campbell, supra note 26, at 576–78. 
 52.  See id. 
 53.  Id. at 577. 
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ated that right. Customary rights were defined historically—typically by deter-
mining the meaning of that right at common law.54 For new rules, however, tex-
tual analysis was far more important. The members of the First Congress, for 
instance, carefully drafted the Establishment Clause—a new rule—whereas their 
revisions of other enumerated rights proceeded with little debate. With limited 
exception, the First Congress was articulating “simple acknowledged princi-
ples.”55 
In theory, then, Founding-Era rights discourse featured two types of rights 
that carried distinct meanings. In practice, however, matters were even more 
complicated, particularly because some terms—like “freedom of the press”—
could readily refer to a natural right and a fundamental positive right.56 And with 
this framing in mind, we can better appreciate the content of—and potential for 
unresolved tensions within—the right to keep and bear arms. 
Insofar as the right to keep and bear arms was a fundamental positive right, 
American elites naturally viewed that right historically. For example, if a legisla-
ture authorized executive officials to arbitrarily disarm the citizenry, as English 
Kings had done in the seventeenth century, that legislation would abridge a cus-
tomary positive right.57 But while this right provided security against the prob-
lems of the past, it could not necessarily resolve the problems of the future be-
cause its application to those problems was not yet settled.58 
In theory, of course, fundamental positive rights could be defined broadly or 
narrowly enough to clarify their application to unanticipated problems. For in-
stance, if one determined that the right to keep and bear arms categorically de-
nied governmental power to regulate the possession or carrying of weapons in 
any manner, then that understanding would resolve all sorts of unanticipated 
questions. By contrast, if the right prevented only arbitrary disarmament by royal 
officials, then its inapplicability to exercises of legislative power would be simi-
larly clear. As it turns out, though, fundamental positive rights were rarely de-
fined with such specificity in advance. Rather, they usually emerged from histor-
ical episodes involving opposition to particular policies, thus giving these rights 
 
 54.  Consequently, those who advocated for the enumeration of positive rights often relied on Eng-
lish authorities like Blackstone. See, e.g., Letter from Richard Henry Lee, Va. Delegate, Cong. of the 
Confederation, to Edmund Randolph, Governor of Va. (Oct. 16, 1787), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 61, 62–63 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1988). 
 55.  See Statement of James Madison, supra note 1, at 1270. 
 56.  See Campbell, supra note 19, at 290–94. 
 57.  Charles II and James II had attempted to use the Militia Act of 1662 and Game Act of 1671 as 
tools of disarmament. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 105, 115–16 (1994). The right to keep and bear arms was included in the 
English Bill of Rights in response to this experience. See id. at 117–21. 
 58.  See Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 103, 112 (2000) (“No coherent intention or understanding of the existence and scope of a private, 
individual right to keep and bear arms could accordingly be derived, because that question did not pre-
sent itself for public debate in the form in which we now know it.”). 
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clear application to some types of governmental acts without necessarily support-
ing or rejecting their extension to others. Consequently, the scope of fundamental 
positive rights was often contested. 
II 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY DECISIONS 
The interplay between natural rights and customary positive rights may seem 
foreign to us, but it was familiar to Americans who had grown up in the customary 
constitutional tradition and had recently justified a political revolution based on 
blended assertions of natural and positive rights. Yet with subsequent develop-
ments in American constitutional law, and particularly the ascension of more ro-
bust judicial review,59 tensions soon emerged over how to construe natural and 
positive rights. 
Police-powers cases were harder for precisely the reasons described earlier. 
Social-contract theory stipulated that the government could limit natural rights 
only in pursuit of the public good, and only possessed the powers conducive to 
that role. Yet exactly what this entailed was highly contestable. As Joseph Priest-
ley summarized: 
That the happiness of the whole community is the ultimate end of government can never 
be doubted, and all claims of individuals inconsistent with the public good are absolutely 
null and void; but there is a real difficulty in determining what general rules, respecting 
the extent of the power of government, or of governors, are most conducive to the pub-
lic good.60 
As a matter of principle, legislative power had to be limited. Yet the “real diffi-
culty” that Priestley identified was hardly within the judicial ken. Judges, after 
all, were not supposed to assess questions “of mere expediency or policy.”61 
A tempting judicial response might be to define the limits of legislative power 
using a historically grounded approach, borrowing from the tradition of custom-
ary constitutionalism. But what, then, should judges do when new social problems 
emerged, leading to novel legislation? A tradition-based interpretive approach 
only works if relevant traditions provide direction. 
In sum, judges had to make judgments about how to maintain fidelity to con-
stitutional principles without surpassing limits on the judicial role.62 Leaving leg-
islatures free to determine the scope of their own powers was increasingly seen 
as a dangerous abdication of judicial responsibility. Yet these issues were not le-
gal in nature—at least not until judges started pretending so. Enforcing natural 
 
 59.  See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 145–89 (2004). 
 60.  JOSEPH PRIESTLY, AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, AND ON THE 
NATURE OF POLITICAL, CIVIL, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 57 (2d ed. 1771). 
 61.  Letter from James Madison, Former U.S. President, to Spencer Roane, Judge, Va. Court of 
Appeals (Sept. 2, 1819), in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES 500, 501 (David 
B. Mattern et al. eds., 2009). 
 62.  For a broader discussion of how this tension shapes doctrine, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY 
AND CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS READ THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2019). 
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rights and underdeterminate positive rights thus inevitably required judges to 
adopt rules that were overinclusive, underinclusive, or a combination of both. 
And that is precisely what one sees in the first Antebellum right-to-bear-arms 
cases. 
A. Bliss v. Commonwealth (Kentucky, 1822)63 
In response to escalating violence, the Kentucky legislature in 1813 made it a 
crime to “wear a pocket pistol, dirk, large knife, or sword in a cane, concealed as 
a weapon, unless when traveling on a journey.”64 Nearly a decade later, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals held that the statute was unconstitutional under the state 
constitutional guarantee “that the right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of 
themselves and the state, shall not be questioned.”65 
Whether the right was “regulated” or “prohibited” was irrelevant, the court 
stated, because “whatever restrains the full and complete exercise of that right, 
though not an entire destruction of it, is forbidden by the explicit language of the 
constitution.”66 “[I]n principle,” the court explained, “there is no difference be-
tween a law prohibiting the wearing [of] concealed arms, and a law forbidding 
the wearing [of] such as are exposed.”67 Consequently, the justices concluded, any 
statutes that “diminish or impair [the right] as it existed when the constitution 
was formed, are void.”68 
The Bliss majority then engaged in an extended defense of judicial review. 
“Whether or not an act of the legislature conflicts with the constitution,” it ob-
served, “is, at all times, a question of great delicacy, and deserves the most mature 
and deliberate consideration of the court.”69 Yet this question “is a judicial one,” 
and “the court would be unworthy [of] its station, were it to shrink from deciding 
it whenever, in the course of judicial examination, a decision becomes material 
to the right in contest.”70 Nonetheless, judges should do so only upon a “clear and 
strong conviction” of unconstitutionality.71 
The extended discussion of judicial review was no coincidence. Kentucky was 
in the midst of a massive political upheaval after lower courts had struck down 
recently enacted debt-relief legislation.72 And with judicial review under attack, 
judges in Kentucky likely had little appetite for defending contestable judgments 
on questions of degree. The only historically grounded line the court could—and 
did—draw with respect to concealed-carry laws was to recognize legislative 
 
 63.  Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822). 
 64.  Id. at 90. 
 65.  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 66.  Id. at 91–92. 
 67.  Id. at 92. 
 68.  Id. at 90. 
 69.  Id. at 94. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See generally Theodore W. Ruger, A Question Which Convulses a Nation: The Early Republic’s 
Greatest Debate about the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826, 847–55 (2004). 
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power to regulate weapons only as far as was done under existing law when the 
constitution was ratified.73 Any other approach would pull judges into the unen-
viable task of coming up with those lines.74 
In sum, Bliss nicely illustrates the importance of formalism and historicism to 
nineteenth-century judicial appraisals of rights, even as judges more widely—and 
more aggressively—viewed themselves as responsible for identifying and enforc-
ing constitutional limits on legislative power. The right to keep and bear arms, 
the Bliss court insisted, could not allow for any new regulations since the judiciary 
had no other way of policing the boundaries. 
B. Aymette v. State (Tennessee, 1840)75 
As in Bliss, the defendant in Aymette was convicted of violating a state law 
that barred the concealed carrying of certain weapons.76 On appeal, he argued 
that his conviction violated the state constitutional declaration that “the free 
white men of this State have a right to keep and bear arms for their common 
defence.”77 This time, however, the argument failed. 
Rather than reading this right as a prohibition against new restrictions of 
weapons, the Tennessee Supreme Court turned to “the state of things in the his-
tory of our ancestors” to determine the meaning of the right.78 That right was 
based on a denial of the King’s authority to disarm Englishmen “by his own ar-
bitrary power, and contrary to law.”79 The historical meaning of the right, in other 
words, was grounded on a concern about self-rule—not a libertarian notion of 
freedom from any legal restraint. Moreover, the additional “evil” that English-
men feared was that the King, through disarming the people and quartering sol-
diers in their midst, would “compel them to submit to the most arbitrary, cruel, 
and illegal measures.”80 
Tennessee’s constitutional provision, the court explained, was “adopted in 
reference to these historical facts,” which therefore shaped its meaning.81 It sup-
plied a right of all free white men to possess arms.82 But the constitutional text 
and its undergirding history indicated a right limited to weapons used “by the 
people in a body, for their common defense.”83 Consequently, this right covered 
 
 73.  See Bliss, 12 Ky. at 90 (concluding that statutes that “diminish or impair [the right] as it existed 
when the constitution was formed, are void”). 
 74.  Notably, the pending debt-relief controversies raised a similar question of whether rights could 
be limited through regulation. See Blair v. Williams, 14 Ky. (4 Litt.) 34, 35 (1823); Lapsley v. Brashears, 
14 Ky. (4 Litt.) 47, 47 (1823). 
 75.  21 Tenn. 154 (1840). 
 76.  See id. at 155 (stating that the defendant “was convicted . . . for wearing a bowie-knife concealed 
under his clothes, under the act of 1837-1838”). 
 77.  Id. at 156 (internal quotations omitted). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 157. 
 81.  Id. at 157–58. 
 82.  Id. at 158. 
 83.  Id. 
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arms “usually employed in civilized warfare, and that constitute the ordinary mil-
itary equipment.”84 By contrast, “those weapons which are usually employed in 
private broils, and which are efficient only in the hands of the robber and the 
assassin,” were outside the scope of the right.85 Moreover, the court continued in 
dicta, the legislature could “regulat[e] the manner in which [militia-related] arms 
may be employed,” though it would be “somewhat difficult to draw the precise 
line where legislation must cease.”86 
Aymette thus reflected a historically grounded interpretive approach, supple-
mented by natural-rights reasoning. The history of the right to bear arms in Eng-
land, the court thought, focused on a particular harm or evil—namely, the dis-
armament of the populace with respect to their means of resisting arbitrary 
power—and it was that evil that the constitution prohibited the state from repeat-
ing.87 In this regard, the Tennessee Supreme Court was invoking the classic inter-
pretive canon that statutes should be interpreted in light of the mischief or evil to 
which the legislature was responding.88 
Aymette thus employed what had been the standard approach to mediating 
the relationship between natural rights, positive rights, and governmental power. 
In part, the court recognized clear historical limits on legislative power. The gov-
ernment, it held, could not generally or arbitrarily disarm the white male citizenry 
with respect to keeping weapons used by militias because of the historical scope 
of the positive right.89 But otherwise legislatures had leeway to restrict natural 
rights, including the possession and use of firearms. Thus, although individuals 
had a natural right to carry a concealed Bowie knife, the legislature could restrict 
that right in order to maintain public safety. Here, the Aymette court was firmly 
rebutting the Bliss approach.90 So long as statutes did not repeat these errors of 
the past or otherwise undermine the militia, the legislature was free to regulate 
weapons in promotion of the common good. 
 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 159. 
 87.  See id. at 157. 
 88.  See Samuel L. Bray, The Mischief Rule, 109 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming) (describing the mischief 
rule and explaining how it is not the same as modern purposivist interpretation); Saul Cornell, The Orig-
inal Meaning of Original Understanding: A Neo-Blackstonian Critique, 67 MD. L. REV. 150, 152–53 (2007) 
(stating that Blackstone and some of the Founders interpreted statutes based on “the evil a provision was 
intended to remedy”). For a similar approach in another right-to-bear-arms case decided the same year, 
see State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 615 (1840) (“The evil which was intended to be remedied . . . was a denial of 
the right of Protestants to have arms for their defence . . . . Such being the mischief, the remedy must be 
construed only to extend so far as to effect its removal.”). 
 89.  I use the term “positive” right for consistency. The Aymette court’s reference to “political” rights 
connoted a subset of positive rights relating to the exercise of political power, as with voting and jury 
service, whereas other positive rights, such as the rule against ex post facto laws, operated merely as 
procedural guarantees or as immunities against a particular type of governmental act. 
 90.  See Aymette, 21 Tenn. at 160 (stating that the Bliss opinion “is far too limited for a just construc-
tion of the meaning of the clause of the constitution they had under consideration”). 
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C. State v. Buzzard (Arkansas, 1842)91 
As in Bliss and Aymette, the defendant in Buzzard argued that the state ban 
on concealed carry of weapons violated his right to keep and bear arms.92 A two-
to-one majority rejected this claim.93 
Chief Justice Ringo began his opinion by returning to first principles. The 
legislature may restrict liberty to advance “the general interests or welfare of the 
whole community,” he explained, and it had wide discretion to choose “the 
means best calculated to attain the object.”94 Thus, for example, although indi-
viduals have a natural right to speech, the legislature generally had authority to 
enact “such limitations as have been found necessary to protect the character and 
secure the rights of others, as well as to preserve good order and the public 
peace.”95 But an exception arose when “some fundamental law . . . expressly, or 
by necessary or reasonable implication, prohibited the Legislature from [doing 
so].”96 This was textbook social-contract theory. 
Turning to the right to keep and bear arms, Ringo defined the right broadly, 
perhaps implicitly recognizing it as a natural right.97 Yet this right was subject to 
regulation under law.98 The crucial question, then, was whether the right also en-
tailed any specific limits on legislative power. 
Ringo swiftly rejected the defendant’s claim that the right to keep and bear 
arms disabled the state from regulating weapons.99 History easily disproved this 
assertion, he reasoned, since governments had long regulated weaponry.100 To be 
sure, the people had a right to defend themselves and their property. But this 
right was regulated by law and was inextricably tied to the role that individuals 
performed as citizens when defending life, liberty, and property through institu-
tions like the militia.101 The constitutional recognition of a right to keep and bear 
 
 91.  4 Ark. 18 (1842). 
 92.  The various opinions refer to the Second Amendment and to the Arkansas Bill of Rights, which 
stated that “the free white men of this State shall have a right to keep and bear arms in their common 
defense.” Id. at 27 (internal quotations omitted). Both Chief Justice Ringo and Justice Lacy agreed that 
the two rights were comparable in scope, notwithstanding their textual differences. See id. at 27 (opinion 
of Ringo, C.J.); id. at 34 (Lacy, J., dissenting). 
 93.  See id. at 27 (opinion of Ringo, C.J.) (concluding that the ban was not “invalid”). 
 94.  Id. at 19–20. 
 95.  Id. at 20. 
 96.  Id. at 19. 
 97.  See id. at 21 (claiming that “the term ‘arms’ . . . probably includes every description of weapon 
or thing which may be used offensively or defensively”). 
 98.  See id. (arguing that “if the right . . . be subject to no legal control or regulation whatever, it 
might, and in time to come doubtless will, be so exercised as to produce in the community disorder and 
anarchy”). 
 99.  See id. at 28 (concluding that the ban was not “repugnant either to the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of this State”). 
 100.  See id. at 22 (pointing out numerous “instances, in which the right to keep and bear arms has 
been . . . subjected to legal regulations and restrictions, without any question as to the power so exer-
cised”). 
 101.  Id. at 23–24. 
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arms, Ringo thus insisted, referred specifically to bearing arms in the perfor-
mance of this civic responsibility.102 Consequently, the legislature could prohibit 
“keeping and bearing arms for any purpose whatever,” but this power was “lim-
ited or withdrawn” insofar as it would effectively disarm the militia.103 
In dissent, Justice Lacy relied largely on consequentialist reasoning, which 
was central to natural-rights discourse. A right limited to the context of militia 
service, Lacy insisted, would be “valueless and not worth preserving.”104 But a 
broader right of the people to keep and bear arms for any lawful purpose, without 
any legal diminution, was “the only security and ultimate hope that they have for 
the defense of their liberties and their rights.”105 Otherwise, he observed, a legis-
lature could “control or regulate it in any manner that they think proper,”106 thus 
allowing that right to be “not only abridged, but literally destroyed.”107 
Lacy’s sweeping policy judgments fit comfortably within natural-rights rea-
soning. To identify the terms of the social contract, one had to reconstruct what 
the people would decide when forming a political society. Consequently, if legis-
lative power to regulate weapons were truly destructive of the ends of the politi-
cal society, then that power did not exist. Lacy’s conclusion, however, was only 
as strong as his underlying policy assessment. He was not starting with a deonto-
logical, libertarian conception of rights. 
Lacy also grounded the right to bear arms on the right of personal self-de-
fense. “Has not every man a natural and an unalienable right to defend his life, 
liberty, or property, when a known felony is attempted to be committed upon 
either by violence or surprise?,” he rhetorically asked.108 “Upon what principle 
has he a right to use force to repel force, and even to slay the aggressor,” Lacy 
then inquired, “if he can not make a successful repulsion otherwise?”109 Preserv-
ing adequate means of defense, he insisted, called for a right to possess and carry 
arms. 
From a natural-rights standpoint, however, this argument was delusory. The 
rationale of Lacy’s critique—namely, the insufficiency of legal remedies as a way 
of preserving private rights—was precisely the same rationale that underpinned 
the Arkansas statute. Lacy’s argument about lives potentially saved because of 
weapons was certainly relevant, but it failed to consider the equal worth of lives 
 
 102.  Id. at 24. 
 103.  Id. at 25. 
 104.  Id. at 35 (Lacy, J., dissenting). 
 105.  Id. at 36. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 35. 
 108.  Id. at 37. 
 109.  Id. at 38. 
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potentially lost. A natural-rights analysis should have evaluated both.110 None-
theless, Lacy’s argument highlights the increased prominence of personal self-
defense in nineteenth-century discourse.111 And it reflects a tried and true way to 
avoid judicial balancing: prioritize some interests and simply ignore the others. 
But Lacy’s view of the right to keep and bear arms acknowledged limits. 
Should a person, “in the exercise of [constitutional rights], commit any unlawful 
act, and prejudice the rights of others,” Lacy explained, “then he would be an-
swerable for their unwarrantable use and indulgence.”112 Thus, for instance, “it 
would be unlawful so to keep arms and ammunition of any kind, as to endanger 
the lives or property of others.”113 
This was yet another approach to constraining legislative power. Lacy’s 
method was far more limiting than history or general social-contractarian princi-
ples supported. But it also had the virtue of being more amenable to judicial en-
forcement. The majority’s approach, as Lacy rightly pointed out, effectively left 
the legislature free to “control or regulate [weapons] in any manner that they 
think proper,”114 which enabled the legislature to restrain liberty in ways that did 
not promote the public good. 
D. Nunn v. Georgia (Georgia, 1846)115 
The final case discussed here was an appeal of a conviction in Georgia for 
openly carrying a pistol.116 Georgia’s constitution did not mention a right to keep 
and bear arms, but the court deemed this omission irrelevant. The right was “one 
of the fundamental principles, upon which rests the great fabric of civil liberty,” 
Judge Lumpkin wrote, and constitutional declarations of that right merely “reit-
erated a truth announced a century before, in the act of 1689.”117 This reasoning 
comported with the court’s approach to other unenumerated rights.118 
In terms of scope, Lumpkin described the right to keep and bear arms as a 
“right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and not militia 
only.”119 Moreover, that right covered “arms of every description, and not such 
 
 110.  Accord Heyman, supra note 41, at 245–46. Importantly, the social-contractarian principles at 
work here put no importance on the idea of state action. The body politic had an affirmative responsibil-
ity to protect against private harm just as much as it had a negative responsibility not to unnecessarily 
restrict rights. 
 111.  See CORNELL, supra note 4, at 137–208. 
 112.  Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 41 (Lacy, J., dissenting). 
 113.  Id. at 42. 
 114.  Id. at 36. 
 115.  1 Ga. 243 (1846). 
 116.  See id. at 243. 
 117.  Id. at 249. 
 118.  See, e.g., Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31 (1847); see generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998); Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State 
Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 119.  Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251. 
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merely as are used by the militia.”120 It was this right, Lumpkin insisted that “orig-
inally belong[ed] to our forefathers, trampled under foot by Charles I and his two 
wicked sons and successors.”121 Thus, he concluded, “so far as the [Georgia stat-
ute] seeks to suppress the practice of carrying certain weapons secretly, that it is 
valid, inasmuch as it does not deprive the citizen of his natural right of self-de-
fence, or of his constitutional right to keep and bear arms.”122 
Thus far, we have seen a variety of ways that judges navigated the relationship 
between natural rights, positive rights, and governmental power. Nunn adds an-
other approach: ipse dixit. To be sure, Lumpkin had carefully surveyed legal prec-
edents and explained why the fundamental law of Georgia recognized a right to 
keep and bear arms. But he provided no analysis whatsoever about the right’s 
scope. Maybe his methodology was historical. Or perhaps it was based on a more 
formalist effort to draw a line between “prohibitions” and “regulations.” Or 
maybe something else. The opinion, however, does not say anything about how 
the court arrived as its halfway conclusion. It refers to a “natural right of self-
defense” and a “constitutional right to keep and bear arms,” but Lumpkin did 
not explain how either concept limited legislative power.123 
From a judicial-process standpoint, ipse dixit has clear drawbacks. From a his-
torical standpoint, however, it had obvious appeal for judges struggling to apply 
underdeterminate rules. Ipse dixit did not, of course, offer a way of avoiding the 
jurisprudential problem. But it at least enabled Lumpkin to keep it concealed, 
particularly when shrouded in an erudite discussion of prior cases and the nature 
of American constitutional rights. 
 In this regard, it is worth remembering Nunn’s jurisprudential context. Previ-
ous studies have argued that the Georgia Supreme Court was trying to chart a 
middle path that reflected contemporary public opinion about weapons regula-
tion.124 And that may be right. But we should not forget that Lumpkin and his 
colleagues had a broader interest in articulating limits on the police powers in 
other ways—including protection of economic rights.125 Nunn did not involve 
those other rights directly, of course. But broader concerns were at play. 
III 
CONCLUSION 
Like grammatical rules, the conventions of social-contract theory shaped dis-
course about the right to keep and bear arms, even when unstated. But what can 
Antebellum right-to-bear-arms cases tell us about the topic of this symposium—
whether there is a right to carry weapons outside the home? Modern norms of 
 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See, e.g., Leider, supra note 5, at 1610. 
 125.  For discussion of various Georgia Supreme Court decisions that relied on similar reasoning, see 
Mazzone, supra note 118, at 37–40, 43, 48–50. 
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judging continue to prize historical analysis and disfavor judicial lawmaking, so it 
would be nice if these cases supplied a simple answer. But I am skeptical that they 
can. 
To see why, consider the logic of Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion in Peruta v. 
County of San Diego.126 The question presented was whether the Second Amend-
ment protects a right to carry handguns outside of the home.127 O’Scannlain ex-
plained that courts must approach questions like this by “look[ing] to the original 
public understanding of the Second Amendment right as evidence of its scope 
and meaning.”128 And he recognized, “in a broad sense,” that under an originalist 
approach “every historical gloss on the phrase ‘bear arms’ furnishes a clue of that 
phrase’s original or customary meaning.”129 Nonetheless, he explained, 
with Heller on the books, the Second Amendment’s original meaning is now settled in 
at least two relevant respects. First, Heller clarifies that the keeping and bearing of arms 
is, and has always been, an individual right. Second, the right is, and has always been, 
oriented to the end of self-defense. Any contrary interpretation of the right, whether 
propounded in 1791 or just last week, is error.130 
“What that means for our review,” O’Scannlain observed, “is that historical in-
terpretations of the right’s scope are of varying probative worth” depending on 
their consistency with Heller’s understanding of Second Amendment history.131 
Arguments by those who denied an individual right to bear arms were “of no 
help.”132 And even when historical figures supported an individual right to bear 
arms, their discussions of the right’s scope were “only marginally useful” when 
they “embrace[d] the premise that the right’s purpose is deterring tyranny” ra-
ther than enhancing self-defense.133 “Since one needn’t exactly tote a pistol on his 
way to the grocery store in order to keep his government in check,” O’Scannlain 
colorfully opined, “it is no surprise (and, thus, of limited significance for purposes 
of our analysis) when these courts suggest that the right is mostly confined to the 
home.”134 
Describing historical figures as having erred in their constitutional views 
might appear contrary to the historical method. But it seems perfectly sensible to 
me that modern judges—who constantly have to assess the persuasiveness of con-
flicting factual evidence and legal opinions—should disregard an argument or 
conclusion that rests on a faulty premise.135 This logic, however, is precisely the 
reason for my skepticism about the modern usefulness of Antebellum right-to-
 
 126.  742 F.3d. 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d. 919 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 127.  Id. at 1147. 
 128.  Id. at 1153 (citations omitted). 
 129.  Id. at 1155. 
 130.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. at 1156. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  See generally William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism and the Law of the Past, 37 LAW 
& HIST. REV. 809 (2019) (discussing the relationship between historical and originalist methodology). 
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bear-arms decisions. All of these decisions rested on embedded assumptions 
about facts and law that we would now reject. 
Some of these assumptions relate to the judicial role. In Bliss, for instance, 
the Kentucky Court of Appeals assumed that constitutional protections of rights 
must be all or nothing.136 One might prefer that view, but it runs against nearly 
all modern rights jurisprudence, including Heller itself.137 Yet so does the broad 
deference to legislative judgments exhibited in cases like Aymette and Buzzard.138 
Other assumptions relate to facts. Consider Judge Lacy’s dissent in Buzzard. 
If gun control actually leads to tyranny,139 the opinion has much to recommend it 
from the standpoint of natural-rights reasoning. But while many people may 
agree with that proposition, its empirical foundation is hardly clear two hundred 
years later. 
In fact, all of the judicial opinions discussed in this Article contain embedded 
assumptions that we do not share. Back then, for instance, citizens played a direct 
role in defending themselves and the state through the posse comitatus and the 
militia, whereas professionalized police forces and the armed services perform 
these functions today.140 Moreover, all of the foregoing cases came out of the 
South, which had a unique culture with respect to firearms. Southern hostility 
toward the concealed carrying of weapons, for instance, was shaped by norms of 
masculinity and honor that treated concealing weapons as unmanly and dishon-
orable.141 And when we consider attitudes toward the rights of the male citizenry, 
we cannot forget the ever-present fear of slave revolts that shaped the Southern 
mindset.142 Natural-rights reasoning made all of these factors highly salient. 
 
 136.  See Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 91–92 (1822) (stating that “whatever restrains 
the full and complete exercise of that right, though not an entire destruction of it, is forbidden by the 
explicit language of the constitution”). 
 137.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008) (recognizing traditional catego-
ries of permissible regulation that have no apparent connection to Founding-Era history). 
 138.  The modern attitude toward judicial enforcement of constitutional rights is perhaps best re-
flected in Justice Jackson’s statement that judges have a duty “of translating the majestic generalities of 
the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into 
concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century.” W. Va. Bd. of Educ. 
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). 
 139.  See State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 36 (Ark. 1842) (Lacy, J., dissenting) (arguing that depriving men 
of the right to keep and bear arms “amounts to tyranny and oppression”). 
 140. But see David B. Kopel, The Posse Comitatus and the Office of Sheriff: Armed Citizens Sum-
moned to the Aid of Law Enforcement, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 764 (2014) (“[A]lmost all 
states continue the longstanding legal tradition that armed citizens may be summoned to aid of law en-
forcement.”). 
 141.  See Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing Southern 
Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J. F. 121, 126 (2015) (stating that “[a]s a result of the dis-
tinct cultural phenomena of . . . honor, Southern men carried weapons” (citations omitted)); see also 
Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Never Intended to Be Applied to the White Population: Fire-
arms Regulation and Racial Disparity, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307, 1318–23 (1995) (stating that “the use 
of arms to resolve personal disputes . . . helped lend a different flavor to the Southern experience with 
arms” and explaining how that experience manifested itself in the courts). 
 142.  See Ruben & Cornell, supra note 141, at 126 (stating that “Southern men carried weapons . . . as 
a protection against the slaves” (citations omitted)). 
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My goal here is not to engage with broader debates over the merits of 
originalism. Rather, my point is that accurately understanding the content of law 
at some point in the past requires appreciating the imbedded assumptions in ear-
lier decisions and then considering whether those assumptions were themselves 
part of the law. This is important even when reading modern decisions. As Mi-
chael McConnell puts it, “[w]hen translating constitutional text into judicially en-
forceable doctrine, a responsible court necessarily takes into consideration not 
only the meaning of the constitutional provision at issue, but also the institutional 
implications of the doctrine for the allocation of power between the courts and 
the representative branches.”143 Failure to appreciate this ordinary feature of 
judging can lead to serious category errors even when interpreting modern prec-
edents.144 This problem is far more serious, though, when reading decisions from 
two hundred years ago—written at a time when underlying conceptions of rights 
were sometimes radically different than our own. 
Unpacking the earliest right-to-bear-arms decisions does reveal that the right 
to possess and carry weapons extended beyond the home.145 But recognition of a 
natural right to possess and carry weapons does not answer questions about the 
scope of governmental power. The enforcement of these rights, many Americans 
thought, was coterminous with ensuring limits on the police powers. And as-
sessing those limits required a host of embedded judgments about things like the 
dangers of private arms-bearing, the role of citizens in law enforcement, and the 
potential perils of disarmament. Yet even as judges increasingly saw themselves 
as arbiters of constitutional limits, norms of judicial behavior counseled against 
open reliance on the policy judgments that natural-rights reasoning required. The 
wide variety of judicial responses in early right-to-bear-arms cases reflect this 
tension. 
At the same time, the scope of the fundamental positive right to keep and 
bear arms was still being worked out, too. The right to keep and bear arms was 
widely recognized as a historically grounded rule—not something created 
through its enumeration in state and federal constitutions. Its force and meaning 
therefore depended on its historical scope—not on its textual enumeration. But 
history did not supply clear answers about how the right should apply in new 
circumstances. 
 
 143.  Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 155 (1997); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 1 (2004); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
54 (1997); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 196–202 (1988). 
 144.  See generally Masur & Ouellette, supra note 13 (discussing judicial failures to appreciate the 
interpretive assumptions in earlier decisions). 
 145.  This Article focuses on historical understandings of rights—not on the linguistic meaning of the 
Second Amendment. Modern originalists generally search for the semantic meaning of written constitu-
tional texts. In my view, this approach significantly departs from the way that Americans conceptualized 
most of their rights two centuries ago. The text of a constitutionally enumerated right might be probative 
of its meaning, but it was generally not constitutive of the right. Cf. Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism without 
Text, 127 YALE L.J. 156, 160 (2017) (recognizing the potential difference between written law, on the one 
hand, and written texts that refer to unwritten law, on the other). 
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Nor does history tell us what to do now. Founding-Era judges generally dealt 
with constitutional uncertainty by deferring to democratic decisions. Judicial re-
view existed, to be sure, but it was highly constrained. As judges became more 
involved in enforcing underdeterminate natural and positive rights, however, 
they increasingly had to make choices, even though accepted methods of legal 
reasoning prevented expressing the contingency of their decisions. The Antebel-
lum right-to-bear-arms cases thus presaged a central dilemma of American con-
stitutional jurisprudence ever since. 
 
